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Scenarios

Situations
I can help with.

The examples below are illustrative, drawn from the kinds of problems that lead people to call an independent consultant. They are not case studies of specific clients. If any of them rhymes with your situation, a short conversation is usually the fastest way to tell whether I can help.

01

Financial services

500–2,000 staff

EDR on every endpoint, a working SOC, a recent pentest cleared. The CISO still wants to know how far an attacker already inside could get before someone notices.

What I can do

  • Run an assumed-breach operation from a single workstation foothold, objective-driven and paced so the blue team can learn alongside.
  • Document the kill chain with timestamps and telemetry, then hand the SOC tuned detection rules mapped to the techniques that actually fired, ready to deploy the same week.
  • Sit with the blue team for a joint debrief, not just a report hand-off.

Red team & adversary emulation

02

Regional operator

500–1,500 staff

Six overlapping SOC tools, four analysts, a renewal cycle worth seven figures. The security lead wants an independent view before signing for another three years.

What I can do

  • Map existing detections to MITRE ATT&CK techniques that actually apply to the sector.
  • For each tool, assess what would be lost if it were removed and whether another tool already covers that gap.
  • Propose a target operating model that fits the team's real size, not a brochure SOC.

SOC design & build

03

IoT / OT operator

Any size

A connected product or an OT-adjacent environment has never had an honest external test. The team wants findings they can fix, not a stack of CVSS numbers.

What I can do

  • Scope the test around the specific asset and what an attacker could plausibly reach.
  • Combine protocol-level testing, firmware analysis, and the boring-but-essential configuration review.
  • Deliver a remediation plan prioritised by exploitability, with a free retest inside 60 days.

Penetration testing

04

Hospital or healthcare group

200–800 staff

The compliance binder is in order. The CISO still cannot say, with a straight face, how long an attacker would sit inside before anyone noticed. The audit answers a different question.

What I can do

  • Run a focused assumed-breach with patient data exfiltration as the objective, paced so the SOC can observe in real time.
  • Document where detection fired, where it should have fired, and where the gap is structural rather than a missing rule.
  • Leave behind detection content and a short narrative the security lead can take to the board, in language the board uses.

Red team & adversary emulation

Your situation probably rhymes with one of these.

Happy to talk about it. The first call is short and costs nothing.